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ABSTRACT 
The fundamental challenge facing security professionals is 
preventing losses, be they operational, financial or mission losses. 
As a result, one could argue that security professionals share this 
challenge with safety professionals. Despite their shared 
challenge, there is little evidence that recent advances that enable 
one community to better prevent losses have been shared with the 
other for possible implementation. Limitations in current safety 
approaches have led researchers and practitioners to develop new 
models and techniques. These techniques could potentially benefit 
the field of security. This paper describes a new systems thinking 
approach to safety that may be suitable for meeting the challenge 
of securing complex systems against cyber disruptions.  Systems-
Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) augments 
traditional security approaches by introducing a top-down analysis 
process designed to help a multidisciplinary team consisting of 
security, operations, and domain experts identify and constrain the 
system from entering vulnerable states that lead to losses. This 
new framework shifts the focus of the security analysis away from 
threats as the proximate cause of losses and focuses instead on the 
broader system structure that allowed the system to enter a 
vulnerable system state that the threat exploits to produce the 
disruption leading to the loss. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
 K.6.5 Security and Protection 
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
STAMP, STPA, STPA-SEC, Critical Infrastructure, Systems 
Thinking. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid developments in software and the rise of software intensive 
systems have produced significant benefits to the global economy 
and society as a whole.  These benefits have given rise to a 
growing dependence on the services provided by these systems 
and their corresponding physical and logical infrastructures.  
Disrupting or otherwise exploiting these infrastructures has 
become the goal of a wide range of potential adversaries.  The 
problem is further aggravated by the fact that disruptions may also 
result from unintentional actions taken by well-intentioned 
operators within the systems themselves.  
Despite increased funding and resources, we do not appear to be 
making satisfactory progress in our ability to secure the complex 
systems that we are increasingly able to create. Arguably, new 
approaches are needed. This paper presents one such approach. 
Applying lessons learned from nearly three decades of research in 
safety engineering for complex systems, this paper presents a 
modified version of a new, more powerful hazard analysis 
technique, called System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), 
developed by Leveson. The extension of 
STPA, called STPA for Security (STPA-Sec), addresses the 
growing problem of securing software intensive systems against 
intentional disruptions.  
Cyber security has largely been framed as a tactics problem, 
focusing on how best to defend networks and other information 
assets against threats.  While necessary, we believe this misses the 
greater objective of securing the systems’ ability to produce the 
services and functions society depends on.  Defending networks is 
not an end in itself; rather it is a means to protecting these higher-
level services and missions against disruptions.  Reframing the 
problem into one of strategy may ultimately produce better 
outcomes. In practice, this reframing involves shifting the 
majority of security analysis away from guarding against attacks 
(tactics) and more towards the broader socio-technical 
vulnerabilities that allow disruptions to propagate throughout the 
system (strategy).  Put another way, rather than focusing the 
majority of the security efforts on threats from adversary action, 
which are beyond the control of the security specialist, security 
efforts should be focused on the larger, more inclusive goal of 
controlling system vulnerabilities. To accomplish this goal, 
STPA-Sec identifies and enforces required constraints on 
unsecure control actions that place the system in vulnerable states 
when subjected to disturbances (whether intentional or 
unintentional). 
This paper is organized into three parts.  The first section 
discusses the limitations associated with treating cyber security 
solely as a tactics problem.  The second section introduces 
systems thinking as a means to reframe cyber security as a strategy 
problem and presents a systems approach used successfully to 
improve safety in complex systems. The third section of the paper 
discusses STPA-Sec and presents a simple example.  
2.  LIMITATIONS IN TREATING CYBER 
SECURITY AS A TACTICS PROBLEM 
The cyber security field tends to draw heavily on language, 
metaphors, and models from military operations.   
There is an important distinction in military doctrine between 
tactics and strategy. Strategy can be considered as the art of 
gaining and maintaining continuing advantage.  In contrast, 
tactics are prudent means to accomplish a specific action. Tactics 
are focused on threats, while strategy models are focused on 
outcomes.   
Most current cyber security assessments have knowingly or 
unknowingly adopted tactics models.  Tactics models emphasize 
how best to defeat a given threat.  For example, a pilot has 
specific tactics that should be employed to defeat an adversary 
aircraft in combat.  The threat dictates the tactics that will most 
likely lead to success, so properly identifying the threat is the first 
step in solving the tactical problem. Likewise, analyzing the threat 
is the first step in the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) security standards [1].  
In tactics models, losses are conceptualized as specific events 
caused by threats.  For example, a security incident consisting of a 
data breach with an accompanying loss of customer Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) is viewed as a single occurrence 
where an adversary successfully precipitates a chain of events 
leading to a loss.  In almost all such cases, security analysts will 
identify some proximate cause that should have served as the last 
barrier or line of defense.  According to this model, if only the 
barrier would have been in place, then the attack would have 
failed.   
This type of approach is often described as “breaking the chain” 
and is a commonly used in security literature as a framework for 
conceptualizing the goal of successful security practices. In the 
case of the TJMAXX data loss, for example, the proximate cause 
of the data loss was attributed to the failure of the store to use the 
proper wireless encryption on their networks [2]. Although threats 
exploiting vulnerabilities produce the loss event, tactics models 
treat the threat as the cause of the loss. According to this thinking, 
the loss is attributed to a threat successfully circumventing several 
barriers to reach its goal. Preventing losses, then, is heavily 
dependent on the degree to which security analysts can correctly 
identify potential attackers, their motives, capabilities, and 
targeting. Once equipped with this knowledge, security analysts 
can analyze their systems to determine the most likely route (or 
causal chain) attackers may take to reach their goal.  Resources 
can then be allocated to place barriers along the chain and prevent 
losses.  
This chain-of-events model of causality is the same one used in 
safety engineering, where the attempt to avoid accidents is 
focused on breaking the chain by either preventing the individual 
failure events or erecting barriers between them to prevent their 
propagation. 
The current threat-based security approach succeeds best under 
the same circumstances that allow tactical success on the 
battlefield: good intelligence and a context where cause and effect 
are closely linked temporally and spatially.  Good intelligence 
reduces uncertainty.  When the means, motives and capabilities of 
potential attackers are so well understood that their preferred 
“route” to their goal can be predicted, then security barriers can be 
erected to break the chain.  In these cases, losses are prevented 
when defenders skillfully execute the well-established practices 
and procedures the situation demands.  An example is network 
administrators disabling unused ports or updating the latest 
malware signatures.  
A threat-based approach is useful for identifying and countering 
security threats against a single, well-defined and well-understood 
system asset or component.  In these cases, a threat actor’s 
potential actions might be evaluated through stochastic models to 
yield a most likely course of action to attack the asset.  Once this 
adversary course of action is identified, the security analyst can 
provide advice to senior leaders on how best to allocate limited 
resources to thwart the attack and break the chain. In other words, 
the high level of threat understanding enables security analysts to 
predict not only where an adversary will attack, but also the 
logical and physical infrastructure that is most important to defend 
in order to thwart the attack.  
Unfortunately, this approach suffers significant limitations when 
applied to securing diverse, interconnected infrastructure 
supporting large-scale, complex organizational activities against 
little understood and rapidly evolving adversaries. The current 
security model doesn't accommodate the properties of software 
intensive systems, nor can the loss mechanism be accurately 
reflected in a linear causality model.  Losses occur as the result of 
complex interactions between the various socio-technical 
components in modern organizations and businesses.  The loss is 
an emergent system outcome, not one found in the failure of 
individual components.  
The rest of this paper describes an alternative strategy model for 
cyber security.  
3. A NEW APPROACH BASED ON 
SYSTEMS THINKING 
Conceiving of causality as a chain of directly related events is at 
least 200 years old.   Traditional safety engineering techniques, 
such as fault tree analysis, based on this model were developed 
over 50 years ago, before computers were used to create the 
highly-interactive, tightly coupled, software intensive systems 
common today.  
The limitations of traditional engineering methods and the need to 
field increasingly complex systems during and immediately 
following World War II led to the development of modern 
systems theory in the 1940s and 1950s [3]. Systems theory 
provides the philosophical and intellectual foundation for systems 
engineering and also for a new, more powerful model of accident 
causality developed by Leveson called STAMP (System-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes) [4].  
STAMP extends traditional causality models from a focus on 
component failures to defining losses as resulting from 
interactions among humans, physical system components, and the 
environment. Losses result when safety constraints on system 
component behavior and interactions are violated. Thus the focus 
shifts from “preventing failures” to “enforcing safety constraints 
on system behavior.” 
In systems theory, the system is conceived as a hierarchical 
structure, where each level enforces constraints on the behavior of 
components at the next lower level. These constraints control 
emergent system behavior, such as safety and security. Control 
loops operate between each level of this hierarchical control 
structure. Figure 1 shows the general form of such control loops.  
Every controller contains a model of the process it is controlling. 
This model is used to determine what control actions are 
necessary. Many accidents related to software or human operators 
are not the result of software or human “failure” (whatever that 
might mean) but stem from inconsistencies between the 
controller’s model of the controlled process and the actual process 
state. For example, friendly fire accidents are usually the result of 
mistaking a friendly aircraft for an enemy. Unsafe control actions 
can result from providing a control action that leads to a hazard, 
not providing a control action that is needed to prevent a hazard, 
providing a control action too early or too late, or continuing a 
control action too long or stopping it too soon. 
 
                    Figure 1. Basic Control Loop 
STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a new hazard 
analysis method based on STAMP. It is being used successfully in 
almost every industry and even non-engineering applications such 
as food safety and financial systems safety. We believe it also has 
potential for application to security. The rest of this paper shows 
how STPA might be extended into a new cyber security analysis 
technique called STAMP-Sec. 
4. APPLYING STPA TO SECURITY 
In the broad sense, security can be considered as protecting a 
system against intentional disruptions.  Adversary activity is a 
common source of these disruptions, but it is not the only source.  
Trusted insiders can also take action to disrupt the operations of 
systems.  Safety can be considered as protecting that same system 
against unintentional disruptions. Hazards lead to safety incidents 
in the same way that vulnerabilities lead to security incidents. We 
believe that the key question facing today’s security analysts is 
how to control vulnerabilities, not how to avoid threats. 
The example provided here, a nuclear reactor system, represents a 
type of critical infrastructure that needs to be protected against 
cyber attack. Physical plants represent high payoff targets for any 
number of potential adversaries and clearly must be defended. In 
the following example, a real nuclear power plant design was used 
but the details had to be changed for obvious reasons. The full 
analysis (for safety) can be found in Thomas [5].  
The analysis was done on a fully digital Pressurized Water 
Reactor (PWR).  Computers direct all control systems including 
those protecting the nuclear reactor (called the “safety system” in 
nuclear engineering).  The plant produces electricity by using heat 
from the reactor to generate steam that powers a turbine. The 
turbine produces electricity that is transferred into the power grid 
for consumer and commercial users.   
The example STPA-Sec analysis focuses on the operation of the 
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) located on the steam line 
from the steam generator.  The MSIV is open during normal 
operations to enable system cooling.  The MSIV can be closed to 
isolate the steam generator from the rest of the system in case of a 
problem with the steam containment system, such as a leak or 
break.  However, closing the MSIV also prevents the secondary 
system from providing adequate cooling to the primary system.  
Lack of adequate cooling can lead to equipment damage or even a 
plant meltdown.  Therefore, it is critical to plant operations that 
the MSIV be open or closed as dictated by the situation.  Failure 
to do so can have disastrous consequences. Note that several real 
world cyber security incidents have occurred over the 
malfunctioning of valves [6].   
STPA-Sec shares the same four basic process steps with its safety 
counterpart, STPA, although the results and detailed procedures 
may be different. The first step is establishing the systems 
engineering foundation for the security analysis. Then the control 
actions that threaten system security are identified. These control 
actions are used to create security requirements and constraints. 
The fourth and final step is to identify causal scenarios that can 
give rise to violations of the security constraints.  
Step 1: Establishing the Systems Engineering Foundation 
Because the current security approach is largely threat based, 
security specialists may be tempted to conduct their assessments 
in isolation.  This approach is logical from a tactical security 
perspective, but likely misses the larger systems perspective.  
Threats exercise physical or logical infrastructure vulnerabilities 
to disrupt or otherwise hinder system function.  In turn, the 
adverse impacts on system function prevent the targeted 
organization from delivering the services that represent its raison 
de entre. Starting with physical threats represents a bottom-up 
tactics approach in contrast with a system engineering top-down 
strategy. 
STPA-Sec reverses the tactics-based bottom-up approach by 
starting at the highest level of the system.  The critical first step is 
identifying the set of losses that are considered unacceptable.  
These losses likely extend beyond the physical and logical entities 
into the higher level services provided by these entities.  Rather 
than beginning with tactics questions of how best to guard the 
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network against threats, STPA-Sec’s systems thinking approach 
begins with strategy questions of what essential services and 
functions must be secured against disruptions or what represents 
an unacceptable loss. This step requires clearly identifying the 
“what(s)” and then using that information to reason more 
thoroughly about the “how(s)” that can lead to the undesirable 
outcomes.  The analysis moves from general to specific, from 
abstract to concrete.   
Two distinctions of this approach are immediately clear.  The first 
distinction is that security experts are unlikely to be capable of 
answering the “what” questions isolated from organizational 
leaders and operations personnel. Security involves tradeoffs and 
the allocation of scarce resources.  Although security concerns 
and insights should inform these decisions, the ultimate 
responsibility for making them rests with the senior leaders 
charged with ensuring that the organization provides its essential 
business or functional services. Although security can advise, it 
will be the senior leaders that decide.   
During the security analysis, it is possible or even likely that 
potential conflicts may arise between priorities. For example, 
there is a constant tension between the need to secure and the 
need to share access to information resources.  A bottom-up 
approach might identify the security challenge associated with 
granting expanded access to information systems, however, the 
approach lacks the larger context to provide insight into the 
corresponding necessity to share in order to accomplish key 
organizational outcomes.  If a decision is made with regard to one 
of the priorities without consideration for the other, a problem is 
likely to arise.  This problem may not be visible to the security 
team, but will be visible to the operations team that requires the 
access in order to perform the higher-level system functions.  
 A prudent way to properly address the potential conflict is 
through a top-down process such as STPA-Sec.  Such an 
approach provides the necessary context for decision makers to 
evaluate the higher-level needs rather than focusing on tactical 
level details.  Certainly, the tactical details are important.  
However, over emphasis and premature emphasis on the details of 
task execution absent the larger context of the systemic purpose 
the tasks support can lead to substituting tactics for strategy.  
The second distinction is that STPA-Sec begins with 
organizational purpose and goals, not physical or logical assets. 
Successful security assessments require a careful establishment of 
priorities.  By establishing the priorities at the start of the 
assessment as opposed to the end, the priorities form a framework 
to both focus and guide the security assessment. This evaluation 
can only be properly made with the benefit of perspective into the 
larger, overall system function.  
One of the most important aspects of the environment is adversary 
activity.  Certainly adversary action is a critical consideration in 
addressing security and preventing intentional losses.  Yet, 
focusing on adversaries or threats too early in the process and 
absent the benefit of context, limits the overall strategic-level 
utility of the security assessment.  Put another way, the goal of 
security is not to guard the physical network and prevent 
intrusions.  The goal is to ensure that the critical functions and 
ultimately the services the network and systems provide are 
maintained in the face of disruptions.  
 Adversary action is only one such disruption (albeit an important 
one).  One potential benefit of applying STPA-Sec to security 
would be to expand the focus of security efforts more toward 
those things that are actually within the control of the 
organization’s leaders, rather than simply expecting cyber security 
experts to defend from a position of disadvantage.  The 
disadvantage occurs because security analysts and defenders are 
forced to react to threats and other environmental disruptions, 
rather than proactively shaping the situation by identifying and 
controlling system vulnerabilities.   
This shift also represents a more judicious use of resources.  
Multiple threats and disruptions can exploit a given system 
vulnerability.  Even under current tactics-based models, a threat 
must ultimately exploit a vulnerability to produce the system loss.  
Rather than trying to initially identify all of the threats and then 
move up to the vulnerabilities they might exploit to produce the 
loss, a more reasonable approach might be to start with addressing 
system vulnerabilities which are likely far fewer than threats and, 
if controlled, can prevent losses to numerous threats and 
disruptions.   
Additionally, controlling vulnerabilities allows security analysts 
to prevent not only the disruptions from known threats, but also 
disruptions introduced by unknown threats. In other words, the 
source of the disruption does not matter.  What matters is 
identifying and controlling the vulnerability.  This limits the 
intelligence burden required to perform the initial system security 
analysis.  STPA-Sec eventually addresses threats, but does so 
much later in the analysis process after generating a deeper 
systemic understanding of the context under which the threats 
may operate and the disruptions that actually lead to critical loss 
events. 
In the nuclear power plant example, Table 1 shows high-level 
vulnerabilities and their relation to four identified loss events.  
The four loss events are: 
L1: Human Serious Injury or Loss of Life 
L2: Environmental Contamination 
L3: Significant Equipment Damage 
L4: Loss of Power Production to the Grid 
 
 Table 1. Vulnerabilities and Related Loss Events 
Vulnerability Related Loss Event 
V-1: Release of radioactive materials L1, L2 
V-2: Reactor temperature too high L1, L2, L3, L4 
V-3: Equipment operated beyond 
limits 
L3, L4 
V-4: Reactor shut down L4 
 
In this paper, V-4 is used to illustrate how STPA-Sec identifies 
the potential vulnerable system states that can lead to the loss of 
power (L4).  The shutdown of the reactor is a specific state.  If the 
reactor is shutdown and if other worst-case environmental 
conditions are present, then one of the specific loss events (L4) 
can result. The reactor shutdown represents a vulnerable state that 
can yield a specific system loss that security analysts must guard 
against.  However, the shutdown of the reactor may NOT 
necessarily lead to a loss of power production to the grid.  For 
instance, there could be other auxiliary generators that could 
provide a small amount of backup power for a limited duration.  
Also, the reactor shutdown might occur during a time when the 
peak demand was low and capable of being met by other sources 
on the power grid.   
The potential causes of the reactor shutdown are not addressed at 
this point, that is done later in the process.  What is important is 
that the analysts identify the system’s vulnerable states and their 
relationship to the specific losses.  
There is another, more subtle consideration.  If defenders prevent 
a reactor shutdown, then L4 should not occur.  Reactor shutdown 
is the state that must be controlled by analysts (strategy).  This is 
different than trying to identify and counter all adversary actions 
or other potential disruptions (tactics).       
The causality model that underlies STPA-Sec is based on control 
and hierarchy.  Rather than attributing the loss to a single event or 
chain of events, STPA-Sec focuses on the development and 
maintenance of proper controls over the system itself.  These 
controls take the form of constraints on system behavior.  In the 
example, the system must be constrained from entering the 
vulnerable states (V1 to V4 in Table 1). These constraints extend 
beyond traditional security constraints, such as access control, to 
include a much broader set of systemic concerns and issues. The 
High Level Control Structure monitors and enforces constraints. 
Creating a Model of the High Level Control Structure  
The loss model underlying STPA-Sec is based on a lack of 
constraints, and developing the High Level Control Structure 
(HLCS) model provides a concise graphical specification of the 
functional controls in the system.  The HLCS modeling is both 
iterative and decomposable into smaller sub-elements.  Starting at 
a high level allows analysts to delve deeper where necessary, 
while simultaneously maintaining perspective on the functional 
whole.  HLCS models include both control actions and feedback. 
The HLCS model represents not only the technological, but the 
organizational sources of control.  As a result, it provides a wider 
perspective on the potential actions available to assist in securing 
operations than might otherwise be available through other 
approaches. For space reasons, however, only the technical parts 
of the control structure are included in the nuclear power plant 
HLCS shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Simplified High Level Control Structure Model 
The simplified HLCS model in Figure 2 has five basic 
components.  The first component is the operator.  In this 
example, the operator would be the individual charged with 
monitoring the overall status of the power plant.  This individual 
would likely be located in a centralized control center.   
The automated Digital Control System (DCS) is the second 
component of the HLCS model.  The automation consists of the 
computer system that the operator uses to monitor the status of the 
actual plant and issue commands necessary to ensure safe 
operation of the system itself. The Digital Control System is 
responsible for interpreting operator inputs and providing signals 
to the actuator.  In the example used here, only two signals are 
considered: open isolation valve and close isolation valve.   
An actuator is the third component and resides at the cyber-
physical junction.  The actuator converts signals from the 
computer system into mechanical activity to open or close the 
physical isolation valve to the cooling system.  A typical plant 
would consist of many of these valves, each executing different 
functions. 
The physical plant is the fourth component.  In this case, the 
isolation valve being controlled resides on the cooling system 
itself.   
The fifth and final element of the example HLCS is the sensors.  
The sensors provide information to the control system about the 
actual condition of the plant.  This information could include data 
on whether or not an emergency (rupture) exists, but also includes 
more obvious information such as the condition of the isolation 
valve (open or closed).    
Identifying Unsafe/Unsecure Control Actions 
The HLCS model combined with the other information in Step 1 
sets the foundation for the remainder of the STPA-Sec analysis.  
Step 1 identified loss events, the vulnerabilities that can lead to 
these losses under worst-case environmental conditions, and the 
HLCS model that captures the control information that is 
transmitted throughout the system in order to allow it to 
accomplish its purpose.  Control information is depicted in Figure 
1 and consists of both control actions from the controller to the 
component directing and prohibiting specific activity and 
feedback from the component back to the controller on the status 
of the component.  Control information is not limited to data and 
signals.  Depending on the part of the control structure being 
considered, it can include regulations, operating procedures and 
other forms of guidance.  It can also include feedback such as 
status updates or After Action Reports.   
Regardless of format, the control information flows throughout 
the hierarchical structure and regulates system performance. Some 
vulnerabilities may only be evident if the connections or 
interactions between the various sub-systems are examined. For 
instance, a safety constraint in a train door controller may require 
that the door never be opened unless the train is at a station or an 
emergency exists. If a terrorist seeking to kill or injure individuals 
through a cyber attack is able to attack the door controller by 
mimicking the “emergency” state, then the controller’s logic 
might send the “open door” command and the train doors would 
open.  If this command was sent with a loaded train operating at 
full speed, it is easy to see how loss of life or damage to the 
system could occur.   
Note that the vulnerability is not in the controller itself, it may 
perform exactly as the software engineer desired it to (sending the 
“open door” command in case of an emergency).  Unfortunately, a 
well-conceived and executed cyber attack in this example uses the 
controller’s logic to achieve a higher-level system loss of killing 
or injuring riders.  There is no security violation in the individual 
system components.  The vulnerability lies in the interactions 
between the components and only manifests under certain worst-
case conditions.   
The simple train door example highlights a key benefit of the 
approach, i.e., the focus on identifying and controlling vulnerable 
states that lead to systems-level losses, not component losses 
themselves.  Step 2 of STPA-Sec identifies which control actions 
are vulnerable and under what circumstances.  
As stated earlier, there are four types of potential unsafe/unsecure 
control actions:  
1. Providing a control action leads to a hazard or exploits the 
vulnerability 
2. Not providing a control action leads to a hazard or exploits a 
vulnerability 
3. Providing control actions too late, too early, or in the wrong 
order leads to a hazard or exploits a vulnerability 
4. Stopping a control action too soon or continuing it too long 
leads to a hazard or exploits a vulnerability. 
Determining the potential causes of the unsafe/unsecure control 
actions is left to the next step. At this point, only the areas 
needing deep dives are identified, potentially leading to a more 
efficient analysis process.  
Table 2 shows examples of each type of unsafe/unsecure control 
actions related to vulnerabilities from Table 1 in the nuclear 
power plant example.   
 
Table 2. Potentially Unsecure Control Actions for Close MSIV 
Control Unsafe/Unsecure Control Actions 
Action  
 Not 
Providing 
Causes 
Hazard 
Providing 
Causes 
Hazard 
Wrong Timing 
or Order 
Causes 
Hazard 
Stopped 
Too 
Soon or 
Applied 
Too 
Long 
Close 
MSIV 
Close 
MSIV not 
provided 
when there 
is a rupture 
in steam 
tube, leak 
in main 
feedwater, 
or leak in 
main steam 
line [V- 2, 
V-1, V-3] 
 
Close 
MSIV 
provided 
when 
there is no 
rupture or 
leak [V-4] 
 
Close MSIV 
provided too 
early (while 
steam pressure 
is high): Steam 
pressure may 
rise, trigger 
relief valve, 
abrupt steam 
expansion [V-
2, V-3] 
 
 
N/A 
 
An important difference between STPA-Sec analysis and that of 
standard safety and security analysis is that the former identifies 
problematic situations beyond those resulting from simple 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability violations. STPA-Sec 
also highlights situations where the system behavior emerges from 
multiple interactions among the system components, all of which 
are behaving “correctly.” 
Developing Security Requirements and Constraints 
The previous steps in the analysis have proceeded in a top-down 
deliberate process.  The first step provided the engineering 
information needed to examine and understand the functioning of 
the system.  This information provides important context used in 
Step 2 to identify a list of unsafe/unsecure control actions.   
The unsafe/unsecure control actions can be used to develop high-
level safety and security requirements and constraints. As an 
example, a constraint on system behavior can be generated that a 
Close MSIV command must never be provided when there is no 
rupture or leak.  
Identifying Causal Scenarios  
The final step in the analysis is the one that bears the most 
resemblance to traditional security analyses. This step involves 
analyzing the existing physical and logical infrastructure to 
determine how the safety and security requirements and 
constraints identified in the previous step might be violated, that 
is, scenarios that can lead to losses.   
Figure 3 shows potential problems in a control loop that can 
violate constraints and lead to a hazardous or vulnerable state. 
The analysis is performed by using these “clues” to generate 
viable scenarios. 
The scenarios, in turn, can be used by system designers to create 
protection against the scenarios occurring or, if not possible, to 
limit damage from them. New types of causes may be used to 
assist in identifying security-related scenarios. 
Traditional safety and security techniques, such as fault trees and 
attack trees, share STPA-Sec’s goal of identifying causal 
scenarios. The major difference is that STPA identifies a large set 
of scenarios, in particular, those not involving component failures 
or compromise but arising from interactions among components. 
STPA-Sec also approaches scenario construction in a much more 
structured manner than simply assembling experts and having 
them brainstorm scenarios that could go wrong from scratch. 
After establishing the necessary appreciation for the system under 
evaluation, STPA-Sec’s top-down, systems thinking process 
guides analysts through not only determination of the potential 
logical and physical component failures capable of producing the 
generated scenarios, but also the interaction failures (e.g. feedback 
delays, conflicting control actions), and the combination of 
component and interaction failures capable of producing the 
generated scenarios.  Equipped with this deeper insight into 
technical and non-technical aspects of the system, security 
analysts are then better prepared to select and apply the most 
appropriate protection tactics. 
In applying STPA-Sec Step 4 to the nuclear plant example, the  
goal of the step is to identify scenarios violating the constraint 
requiring that “close MSIV” not be issued when there is no 
rupture or leak present.  The HLCS model shows that the operator 
issues the close MSIV control action to the automated digital 
control system based on feedback on the valve status (ruptured or 
not ruptured).  If a rupture exists, the “close MSIV” control action 
should be given.  If no rupture is actually present, then the 
previous steps of the analysis identify the fact that issuing the 
“close MSIV” control action introduces a vulnerability that can 
lead to a loss.   
For the nuclear power plant example, one possible violation 
scenario involves the human operator receiving the wrong 
information about the rupture status of the system, that is, a 
scenario that causes the operator to believe the pipe has been 
ruptured when it has not or vice versa.  Because the operator 
depends on the system feedback that flows from the physical 
cooling system to make the proper decision, any of the control 
flaws in Figure 3 between the controlled process and the 
controller could potentially cause the operator to believe a rupture 
exists when it does not and issue the close MSIV control action.  
Depending on the design of the specific hardware and software 
used in the plant, a very unsophisticated cyber attack might prove 
plausible.  The attack need not necessarily change the operator’s 
display or inject false data.  It is possible that simply preventing 
the sensor from transmitting information to the DCS (generating a 
missing feedback problem) through a Denial-of-Service Attack 
might be sufficient to create the scenario if the DCS software was 
written to issue the rupture indication to the operator as a 
Figure 3. Control Loop Disruptions Leading to Hazardous / Vulnerable States 
precaution in the case of a lost feedback signal.   
Under most circumstances, this logic (reflected in the DCS 
process model) could be prudent, especially if the programmers 
thought that absence of a rupture status signal would only occur in 
situations where significant physical damage had already taken 
place.  This assumption would necessitate closing the MSIV to 
isolate the main steam generator from the rest of the system. 
Clearly, the security analysts must assess the viability of the 
scenario to determine if deeper analysis or even reengineering is 
warranted. The probability of the feedback between the sensor and 
DCS being disrupted is not the question or focus. STPA-Sec 
reveals the fact that if the missing feedback problem arises, it will 
place the system in a hazardous/vulnerable state.  This state 
occurs despite the fact that all components; DCS, actuators, 
sensors, MSIV, cooling system, and operator are all functioning 
normally.  In this case, system analysts and operations experts will 
need to work together to apply their skill and judgment to 
determine which scenarios require even deeper technical analysis.  
Unlike other approaches, security analysts using STPA-Sec are 
not forced to depend on their creativity to generate the full list of 
scenarios from scratch. Rather, STPA-Sec helps illuminate loss 
scenarios in ever-increasing detail all the while allowing analysts 
to maintain their perspective on the larger system. In informal 
evaluations of STPA-Sec by security analysts and operations 
personnel, participants were surprised that using it helped them to 
consider threat scenarios that they had not thought of previously. 
A more scientific evaluation of the STPA-Sec is currently being 
performed. 
STPA-Sec does not provide answers about what specific counter 
measures should be taken.  Identifying protection mechanisms is 
and remains the realm of the security specialists.  What STPA-Sec 
does provide is a potentially useful tool for identifying those 
scenarios that should be the focus of cyber security efforts to 
secure specific systems.  Additionally, STPA-Sec provides 
traceability between the scenarios and the losses. 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has described how the tactical-level cyber security 
problem can be elevated from simply guarding the network to the 
higher-level problem of assuring the overall function of the 
enterprise. A new paradigm employing systems theory that has 
recently been introduced into safety is shown to apply to security 
as well as to safety.  
In some ways this reframing will require redefining and 
expanding how security specialists think about their jobs.  
Perhaps one of the most important questions to ask about the 
current threat-based tactics model is whether or not organizations 
will devote resources to addressing system vulnerabilities that 
may not appear to be likely to be threatened.  For example, STPA-
Sec has shown how the particular set of conditions in the example 
could lead to a loss.  However, if the scenario was presented just 
in terms of threat activity and absent the top-down traceability 
STPA-Sec provides, how likely are senior leaders to expend 
resources to address the vulnerability?  Perhaps rather than 
framing the decision in terms of likelihoods that cannot be known, 
security specialists would be better off presenting decision makers 
with the scenarios that if acted upon will lead to a loss.   
There will always be a need for good tactics.  If current trends are 
any indication, the need for educated and skilled security analysts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
and engineers will only grow.  Tactical models will continue to 
play an important role in security, yet strategy models must 
complement them.  STPA-Sec will not replace good security 
practices, but it may improve them by providing a more clear 
focus for those designing and defending our software-intensive 
systems. The scope of the paper is limited in that it focuses on 
losses resulting from violations of integrity and availability but 
not confidentiality violations. We believe these can be handled 
equally well within this framework. Another feature of STPA-Sec, 
which was not covered, is its ability to assist analysts in 
examining how security constraints might degrade over time. See 
Leveson and Laracy for more on this topic [7] .  
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